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D
escribed by Congressman Barney Frank as 
“a market-friendly model” for bank reform,1 
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) 
was passed by Congress in 19772 to fuel 
reinvestment as a cure for urban blight, and to promote 
access to mortgage capital to remedy the adverse impli-
cations of persistent redlining. In deference to concerns 
about unsound and unprofitable loans, the CRA did not 
establish specific benchmarks or levels of credit, nor did 
it provide much guidance as to how regulators should 
evaluate bank performance.3 Instead, the CRA created 
an affirmative obligation for banks to reinvest in poor 
communities. 
While some critics continue to debate the effectiveness 
and cost of CRA regulations, a report issued by the Feder-
al Reserve Board in 2000 concluded that mortgage loans 
that satisfy the low- and moderate-income (LMI) element 
of the CRA’s Lending Test proved to be at least marginally 
profitable for most institutions, and that many institutions 
found that CRA lending performed no differently than 
other lending.4 Others have recently raised concerns that 
the CRA caused the subprime debacle, but analysis of the 
data proves otherwise. Former Federal Reserve Governor 
Kroszner’s article in this publication succinctly addresses 
these concerns.5 
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Beginning in 1977, the problem shifted from access 
to credit, to access to fair credit; today the LMI com-
munity has come full circle to face renewed problems 
with access to credit. Over the last three decades, the 
proportion of loans under the CRA has continued to de-
cline. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data 
from 2006 indicate that “only ten percent of all loans 
are CRA-related — that is, lower-income loans made by 
banks and their affiliates in their CRA assessment areas.”6
Meanwhile, 34 percent of all mortgage loans were 
LMI loans. Removing the ten percent of CRA-related 
loans, 24 percent of all loans were outside of the regu-
latory reach of the CRA and were LMI loans. The 24 
percent of non-CRA mortgage lending includes 13 per-
cent originated by CRA-regulated lenders outside their 
assessment areas and another 11 percent originated by 
independent mortgage companies. Therefore, while low-
income borrowers and neighborhoods had increased 
access to credit by the mid-2000s, the majority of this 
lending was not covered by the CRA and therefore pro-
vided fewer consumer protections. 
The importance of regulatory and supervisory uniformi-
ty and the need to restore access to fair credit for all bor-
rowers places the CRA at the center of current discussions 
on regulatory reforms. This is not to suggest a return to the 
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days of lax underwriting and opaque markets. Instead, as 
access to fair credit is restored, the CRA-regulated entities’ 
expertise about safe and sound lending to LMI neighbor-
hoods could prove invaluable for efforts to address the 
foreclosure crisis and stabilize neighborhoods. Beyond 
learning from the CRA’s successes, there is also a need to 
address the CRA’s greatest weakness: the lack of uniform 
coverage across the industry. This flaw enabled less super-
vised nonbank lenders7 to operate largely outside of the 
CRA regulatory framework and to gain market share from 
more closely regulated mortgage market participants.8 As 
the subprime crisis unfolds, the need for more uniform 
regulations and consumer protections for all borrowers has 
become evident.
The purpose of this paper is fourfold. First, we review 
the historic and regulatory changes in each decade 
since the enactment of the CRA. Second, we explore 
the evolution of the mortgage market, including the 
rise of large organizations, the growth of secondary 
market sources of funding and wholesale lending, and 
the proliferation of new products. Next, we discuss the 
current industry and regulatory challenges, focusing on 
the differences in lending inside and outside of assess-
ment areas and by nonbank entities. We consider how 
and why this coverage varies and its adverse effects. 
Lastly, we consider ways to reform the CRA. We suggest 
applying the CRA framework to all lenders, reconsider-
ing assessment area definitions, expanding fair lending 
enforcement, improving data collection for compliance 
monitoring, and finding ways for all institutions to pro-
vide all services.
Methodology
This article utilizes the Joint Center for Housing Stud-
ies Enhanced Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
Database, which combines loan-level data on the char-
acteristics of one- to four-family home mortgage origina-
tions and borrower information, as well as data on lender 
characteristics and branch locations from the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal 
Reserve).9 The Federal Reserve’s lender file contains infor-
mation that facilitates aggregation of individual HMDA 
reporters into commonly owned or commonly controlled 
institutions, which can then be analyzed as integrated 
units. The assessment area definitions come from the 
Board’s branch-location file. This article assumes that if a 
lending entity subject to the CRA has a branch office in 
a particular county, then that entire county is part of that 
entity’s assessment area. Loans made in counties where 
the lending entity does not have a branch are assumed to 
fall outside of that entity’s assessment area.
To assess the influences of economic, demographic, 
and housing market trends on lending, the Joint Center 
linked other information on metropolitan area and neigh-
borhood characteristics to the HMDA loan-level data. 
These included U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) data used to classify loans based on 
both the income of the applicant and the income of the 
census tract in which the property is located.10 
Although imperfect in many ways, HMDA data pro-
vide a complete census of mortgage lending, including 
information on first- and second-lien mortgages for the 
purchase and refinance of one- to four-family owner-
occupied residences, as well as absentee-owned one- to 
four-family structures. Unlike other readily available 
data, HMDA provides information on borrower income 
and race/ethnicity, as well as the location of the property 
identified at the census tract level. This permits a detailed 
assessment of the impact of changing patterns of mort-
gage lending on both historically disadvantaged popula-
tion subgroups and specific neighborhoods. 
Supported in part by the Ford Foundation, the Joint 
Center Enhanced HMDA Database has been used to 
7	 “Nonbank	institutions”	are	independent	mortgage	banks	(IMBs)	and	other	independent	mortgage	lenders.		These	terms	may	be	used	inter-





Community Reinvestment Act: Past Accomplishments and Future Regulatory Challenges,” Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New	York	(2002),	available	at	http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/governmentprograms/cra02-3_apgar.pdf.	
10  For a more complete description of the database see Joint Center for Housing Studies (JCHS), “The 25th Anniversary of the Community Re-
investment Act: Access to Capital in an Evolving Financial Services System,”  prepared for the Ford Foundation by the JCHS of Harvard Univer-
sity,	March,	2002,	available	at	http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/crareport.html.		Note	that	in	addition	to	information	on	loan	originations,	
the HMDA data also include limited information on the sale of mortgages by loan originators to wholesale investors or mortgage conduits.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
14
support a wide range of innovative research. To date, 
these data have been used in ongoing Joint Center 
research on the impact of the CRA on housing market 
dynamics,11 the implications of the changing mortgage 
banking industry for community-based organizations,12 
and how the uneven application of mortgage market 
regulations in both the primary and secondary market 
combined to permit unfair mortgage pricing with respect 
to race and ethnicity.13 Finally, these data were deployed 
in a broader examination of the impact of the mort-
gage market meltdown on low- and moderate-income 
communities.14
The Regulatory Environment
The 1970s: The CRA Marks a New Era in Regulation
In the late 1970s, many inner cities were faced with 
urban decline and deterioration while the suburbs were 
booming. Housing advocates were concerned that 
lower-income and minority residents of inner-city com-
munities did not have access to conventional mortgages 
and small business lending.15 Many reasons for this 
disinvestment have been put forward, including blatant 
discrimination in the form of ‘redlining,’ where conven-
tional lenders refused to lend to certain borrowers or 
neighborhoods based on their race or income. Beyond 
the systemic causes of this disinvestment, some have 
argued that conventional lenders lacked lending rela-
tionships within these lower-income communities and/or 
used traditional underwriting criteria that did not address 
non-conforming, yet creditworthy applicants.16 
Grassroots community groups working in coali-
tion through National People’s Action pointed out that 
depository institutions accepted deposits from inner-city 
neighborhoods yet refused to lend in these same areas, 
choosing instead to lend in more affluent and grow-
ing suburban areas. To address concerns about how 
deposits were deployed, advocates argued that banks 
were obligated by a quid pro quo: if banks receive 
federal benefits (including federal deposit insurance, 
low-cost capital, or access to the payment system and 
the Discount Window) they are obligated to serve the 
credit needs of their entire service areas. This quid pro 
quo was one of the leading Congressional arguments 
for new legislation.17 There was also discussion at the 
time of a greater obligation of banks to improve access 
to underserved communities, with the goal of reducing 
discriminatory practices. 
Fair lending laws were already on the books but did 
not proactively address the concern that low-income and 
minority consumers and neighborhoods lacked access 
to credit. Following the civic unrest of the late 1960s 
and the assassination of Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., the 
Fair Housing Act, passed as part of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1968,18 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) 
of 197419 prohibited creditor discrimination. To support 
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fair lending enforcement, in 1975 the HMDA20 acknowl-
edged the failure of lending institutions to provide equal 
access to credit and ensured that information would be 
available to quantify whether institutions met the credit 
needs of their communities.
Enacted in 1977, the CRA established a “continuing 
and affirmative obligation” for federally insured deposi-
tory institutions to help meet the credit needs of their 
local communities and required that lenders demon-
strate that they serve the convenience and needs of LMI 
communities with both credit and deposit services. To 
encourage fair lending and curb the racially discrimi-
natory practice of redlining, the CRA sought to have 
lenders use the same loan criteria, regardless of whether 
borrowers lived in lower-income central-city neighbor-
hoods or more prosperous communities.21 The CRA 
promotes an increased distribution of capital to LMI and 
minority households and at its enactment, covered a 
substantial share of all home mortgage and small busi-
ness lending activities.
The initial form of CRA enforcement included peri-
odic non-public exams, subjective examination proce-
dures, and the ability of regulators to delay merger or 
expansion proposals of institutions that did not comply 
with CRA obligations. The initial rulemaking established 
12 assessment factors to evaluate a bank’s performance 
and instituted periodic CRA exams for depository insti-
tutions.22 To incentivize performance, these examina-
tions were to be considered when an institution applies 
to open a branch, merge with another institution, or 
become a financial holding company.
CRA regulations also provided an opportunity for 
public comment during the merger process. Community 
groups used this opportunity to pressure banks to reinvest 
in underserved communities and to encourage lenders to 
meet with community groups to consider a CRA agree-
ment.23 Yet, just eight of 40,000 applications were denied 
due to the CRA in the first decade of the regulation.24 
With no public disclosures of ratings, few mergers to 
protest, and evaluations based on the lender’s intentions 
instead of tangible outcomes, advocates found it difficult 
to evaluate a lender’s track record and pressure poor 
performing lenders to reinvest in low-income neighbor-
hoods. This would change over the next two decades.
The 1980s and a Renewed Focus on Fair Lending
Arguably, CRA exams in the 1980s did little to 
expand lending in underserved markets, as 97 percent 
of institutions received one of the two highest ratings, 
and some regulators conducted no CRA exams at all.25 
In a world of limited consolidation and evaluation, the 
CRA had limited ability to punish poor performance or 
reward “good behavior” through denying or permitting 
mergers. While some community activists used the CRA 
mandate to pressure banks to experiment with new loan 
underwriting criteria and products to meet the needs 
of their communities, without publicly available rat-
ings it was difficult for community groups to scrutinize 
institutional lending records and create a reputational 
risk for poor performance. Meanwhile, underserved 
markets continued to lack access to credit, and racial 
disparities persisted. Documenting these challenges was 
the ground-breaking, Pulitzer Prize–winning “Color of 
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raised concerns about the ongoing racial disparities in 
access to mortgage loans and the lack of enforcement 
of the CRA and fair lending laws. Meanwhile, commu-
nity groups pushed Congress to adopt the Fair Hous-
ing Amendments Act of 1988 to expand the scope and 
strengthen the enforcement of the Fair Housing Act and 
address ongoing racial disparities.
After the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s, 
Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Re-
covery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989.26 FIRREA 
required regulators to prepare a detailed written evalu-
ation of lenders’ CRA performance; mandated public 
disclosure of CRA ratings and evaluations; established 
a four-tier descriptive rating system; and expanded the 
HMDA data to include race, ethnicity, gender, and 
income and enabled community groups to link HMDA 
data with census tract information to allow more de-
tailed geographic and demographic analysis. These 
actions strengthened the ability of community groups to 
evaluate and pressure lenders to actively invest in LMI 
neighborhoods.
Congressional concern over the CRA’s effectiveness 
led to even broader changes in 1989. As the regulatory 
climate changed, the press and community advocates 
raised public awareness of the increasing number of 
mergers and focused senior banking executives’ atten-
tion on the reputational risk of being labeled an unfair 
lender. The increase in federal regulatory action and the 
new public disclosures encouraged community groups 
to negotiate more CRA agreements.27 Meanwhile, the 
Federal Reserve denied its first merger due to the in-
stitution’s lack of effort to meet the credit needs of the 
community, and the Federal Reserve published a policy 
statement outlining a more aggressive regulatory stance 
towards the CRA.
CRA Regulations Did Not Keep Pace with the 
Restructuring in the 1990s
When the CRA was first enacted, regulated deposito-
ries largely engaged in mortgage lending through branch 
banking locations. However, the 1990s witnessed a radi-
cal transformation of the financial services industry with 
which the CRA could not keep pace. Emerging technol-
ogy in data processing and telecommunications encour-
aged the growth of large mortgage banking operations, 
though limits on the geographical expansion of deposit-
taking organizations slowed this trend somewhat. 
At the same time, new sources of funding for resi-
dential mortgages emerged. Rather than depend on 
deposits to fund loans, mortgage lending operations like 
the rapidly growing independent mortgage banks (IMBs) 
were able to tap global capital markets and institutional 
investors to gain access to virtually unlimited amounts 
of mortgage capital. This new source of funding and the 
ability to operate outside the confines of federal regula-
tion enabled IMBs to capture mortgage market share 
from traditional banks. Indeed, according to an analysis 
of HMDA data, from 1990 to 1994 the share of all mort-
gage loans originated by IMBs more than doubled to 38 
percent.28 In contrast, the share of lending by traditional 
deposit-taking organizations declined by 20 percentage 
points to 39 percent, while the share of loans made by 
mortgage banking subsidiaries and affiliates of traditional 
banks held constant at just over 20 percent.
The rise of IMBs, along with equally dramatic 
changes in the structure of the retail banking industry, 
prompted a significant legislative response. In 1994, the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act eliminated most restrictions on interstate bank 
acquisitions, expanding the ability of banks to operate 
on a multi-state basis. Some advocates argued that this 
act was the “final move in an almost complete disman-
tling of long standing legal barriers to the geographic 
spread of banks.”29 After the passage of the Riegle-Neal 
Act, some banks extended their own branch networks 
across county or even state lines. However, much of this 
geographic expansion was accomplished by a series of 
mergers and acquisitions, including the acquisition of 
major retail banking and mortgage banking affiliates and 
subsidiaries that became the building blocks of today’s 
financial services giants. 
As discussed below, the geographic expansion of 
bank lending, the growth of IMBs, and the increasing 
tendency for regulated depositories to conduct their 
26	 	FIRREA,	12	U.S.C.	2906(b)	(2000).
27	 	Alex	Schwartz.		“From	Confrontation	to	Collaboration?		Banks,	Community	Groups,	and	the	Implementation	of	Community	Reinvestment	
Agreements.”  Housing Policy Debate 9:3, (1998).
28   This analysis comes from data collected by Robert Avery at the Federal Reserve Board of Governors for a paper in this publication by Robert 
Avery, Marsha Courchane and Peter Zorn entitled, “The CRA Within a Changing Financial Landscape,” 2009.
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mortgage banking operations through subsidiary and 
affiliate organizations had dramatic implications for the 
CRA. First and foremost, these trends called into ques-
tion the basic rationale behind the CRA, namely the 
link between geographically defined deposit-taking and 
a geographically determined set of mortgage lending 
obligations. At the same time, these trends highlight the 
importance of existing CRA regulations, especially the 
fact that regulators could use CRA performance to deny 
requests for mergers or acquisition during the late 1990s. 
Rather than fundamentally rethink and potentially 
realign the rationale for CRA intervention into private 
mortgage markets in the mid-1990s, the legislative and 
regulatory response was modest. For example, in re-
sponse to concerns raised by industry and community 
leaders about the lack of consistent performance-based 
reviews and the burden of CRA compliance, the agencies 
began a review of the CRA in the early 1990s at President 
Clinton’s request. The supervisory agencies issued joint 
regulations in 1995 to “revise the CRA evaluation process 
and make it more objective and performance oriented.”30 
Focusing on specific performance measurements, these 
regulations required greater disclosure on a range of 
lending (including community development lending) and 
outlined specific tests for large retail, small retail, and 
wholesale/limited purpose institutions. The three-pronged 
test of lending, investment, and service was instituted for 
large retail depositories, while small banks received a 
more streamlined treatment.31 
While the 1995 regulations sought to reduce subjec-
tivity, examiners still consider the “performance context” 
and apply the relevant test depending on the institution 
and its marketplace. Furthermore, the CRA continues to 
scrutinize assessment area lending and banking services, 
and the revised Lending Test also measures lending by 
the distribution of mortgage loans to borrowers of differ-
ent income levels. Because HMDA data allow monitor-
ing of institutions’ lending patterns, much of the scrutiny 
from community groups has remained on the Lending 
Test.32 With the growing importance of subsidiary and af-
filiate activity, banks are also allowed to choose whether 
the lending, investing, or service activities of their affili-
ates are considered in their CRA examinations. Given 
that these affiliates and subsidiaries were often mortgage 
companies specializing in serving lower-income borrow-
ers with risky mortgage products, it is likely that much of 
this volume therefore escaped examination. 
In an effort to bring other banking regulation into 
compliance with the changing market trends, the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act 
(GLBA) was passed in 1999. Given the prevailing de-
regulation mindset, it was difficult for CRA proponents 
to make the case for increased regulation, and many 
perceived that the best course of action was not to make 
dramatic changes for fear of losing the CRA entirely. The 
most substantial effect of the GLBA was the partial repeal 
and amendment of the Glass-Steagall Act and the liberal-
ization of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA). Glass-
Steagall had erected walls between commercial banking 
and insurance and investment banking, which GLBA 
dismantled. GLBA allowed commercial banks, insurance 
underwriters, and investment banks to affiliate under the 
umbrella of a new entity know as a financial holding 
company, while authorizing less frequent examinations of 
smaller banks with Satisfactory or better CRA ratings. 
Under the new rules, financial institutions could now 
become large conglomerates through a new financial 
holding company structure, so long as the holding 
company’s depository institutions had and maintained 
CRA ratings of Satisfactory or Outstanding. If that and 
other requirements were satisfied, the financial holding 
company could be formed with no opportunity for pub-
lic comment on the company’s CRA record.33 Interest-
ingly, given CRA opponents’ concerns over the safety 
and soundness of CRA-motivated lending activity, the 
GLBA directed the Federal Reserve System to report to 
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Congress and to make available to the public the default 
rates, delinquency rates, and profitability of these lend-
ing activities. These “sunshine” provisions also required 
public disclosure and annual report filings concerning 
any CRA agreements made between lenders and com-
munity groups.34 
 
CRA Revisions in the 2000s and the Rise  
of Subprime Lending
The revolution in mortgage finance during the 1990s 
spilled over into the new millennium in the form of an 
equally dramatic explosion of new subprime mortgage 
products.35 These products seemed to foster expanded 
access to homeownership by communities and individ-
uals not well-served by traditional prime loan products. 
At the time, many advocates argued that the growth of 
subprime lending was linked to various predatory loan 
features and lending practices that encouraged new 
borrowers to take on mortgage obligations that they 
did not understand or were unable to pay. Despite the 
importance of the rise of subprime lending to the LMI 
market, the largest share of this new subprime lending 
took place outside of the CRA-regulated channel, as we 
explain below.
Despite the substantial changes sweeping the mort-
gage market, substantive changes to the CRA were mod-
est. The 2001 joint Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-
making (ANPR) sought comments on a range of issues 
concerning the limited ability of the CRA to keep pace 
with an evolving market; many of these issues persist to-
day. The eight areas of investigation were: the large retail 
institutions’ evaluations through the three-pronged test, 
the small institutions’ streamlined evaluations and asset 
threshold, the community development test as applied to 
limited-purpose and wholesale institutions, the strate-
gic plan option, the performance context as it relates 
to quantitative and qualitative evaluations, the role of 
assessment areas to reasonably and sufficiently designate 
communities, the lender’s option to include affiliate ac-
tivities in the CRA exam, and the current data collection 
requirements and maintenance of public files.36 
Early in the discussions, there was a proposal to 
increase the Small Bank asset threshold for institutions 
with total assets of less than one billion dollars. In re-
sponse to community groups’ concerns, the 2004 Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) focused largely on the 
treatment of these small banks and proposed increasing 
the threshold to include institutions with total assets of 
less than $500 million, excluding any holding company 
assets.37 After considerable feedback, the Federal Reserve 
System and the FDIC developed the designation Interme-
diate Small Bank (ISB) and an ISB two-pronged test, and 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) later 
agreed to this recommendation. 
Determining that the CRA was basically sound, the 
2005 joint Final Rule of the CRA as published by the 
Federal Reserve, OCC, and FDIC established the ISB 
category and clarified that lenders’ CRA evaluations 
would be adversely affected by discriminatory, illegal, 
and abusive credit practices in regards to consumer 
loans regardless of whether the loan is inside or outside 
of an assessment area or within the bank or an affili-
ate. Meanwhile, the OTS announced that it would not 
conduct CRA examinations for institutions holding less 
than $1 billion in assets, effectively exempting nearly 
90 percent of the institutions it regulates, and the FDIC 
proposed a similar rule.38 By 2007, the OTS agreed to 
adopt the 2005 Joint Final Rule.39 Yet, the lack of early 
34	 	Board	of	Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System,	“The	Performance	and	Profitability	of	CRA-Related	Lending.”
35   As described by Eric Rosengren, “Housing and the Economy:  Perspectives and Possibilities,” in a speech to the Massachusetts Mortgage 
Bankers Association, Boston, MA, January 8, 2009:  “subprime” loans refer to mortgages that have a higher risk of default than prime loans, 
often	because	of	the	borrowers’	credit	history.	Certain	lenders	may	specialize	in	subprime	loans,	which	carry	higher	interest	rates	reflecting	the	
higher risk. Banks, especially smaller community banks, generally do not make subprime loans, although a few large banking organizations 
are active through mortgage banking subsidiaries. According to interagency guidance issued in 2001, “The term ‘subprime’ refers to the credit 
characteristics of individual borrowers. Subprime borrowers typically have weakened credit histories [and] may also display reduced repay-
ment	capacity	as	measured	by	credit	scores,	debt-to-income	ratios,	or	other	criteria…	Subprime	loans	are	loans	to	borrowers	displaying	one	or	
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agreement by the regulators raised concerns by advo-
cates about potential regulatory arbitrage.40 Meanwhile, 
the 2005 Final Rule left untouched important issues such 
as the definition of assessment areas and the unevenness 
of CRA coverage across mortgage lenders raised in the 
initial 2001 ANPR. 
Today, the CRA is enforced through periodic exams 
that establish a public performance rating and report 
fair lending violations.41 Regulators take into account 
not only the volume of lending but also the distribution 
across geography and borrower characteristics as well as 
innovation and flexibility of lending to underserved com-
munities. As mentioned earlier, illegal practices and fair 
lending violations are considered in the assignment of the 
lender’s rating and are reported to the appropriate agen-
cies, as clarified in the 2005 Final Rule. These ratings and 
the HMDA data are publicly available, allowing for press 
coverage, permitting public comment on bank expansion 
applications, and creating a tangible reputational risk 
for lenders who seek to grow their operations. Providing 
a public track record through CRA agreements and the 
comment process has historically given leverage to com-
munity groups to act as “regulators from below” and sup-
port enforcement efforts.42 It remains to be seen whether 
community groups will continue to have such leverage, 
given the rapid changes underway in the financial world. 
The Revolution in Mortgage Finance
Since the CRA was passed in 1977, there has been 
a virtual revolution in mortgage finance—to which the 
CRA has failed to adapt. When the CRA was enacted, 
depository lenders held the majority of loans that they 
originated in portfolio, because underwriting standards 
and mortgage documents varied considerably, and third-
party investors were reluctant to purchase mortgages 
that lacked adequate credit enhancement and standard 
features. As recently as 1980, nearly half of all mortgages 
for one- to four-family homes were originated by depos-
it-taking thrift organizations and another 22 percent by 
commercial banks. As a result of the dramatic restructur-
ing of the mortgage market over the past quarter-century, 
today the largest share of mortgage capital flows through 
a wide range of unsupervised or only marginally super-
vised entities.43 Changes include the growth of second-
ary market sources of funding, the rise of large organi-
zations and nonbank lenders, the proliferation of new 
product development, the expansion of wholesale opera-
tions, and the decline of small bank mortgage lending.
The Rise of Large Organizations
The last thirty years have witnessed a dramatic 
consolidation of the mortgage and banking industry. 
Stimulated by the globalization of financial services, 
the removal of federal and state-level restrictions on the 
expansion of operations across county and state bound-
aries fueled a dramatic rise in the number of large bank-
ing operations. In some instances depositories expanded 
by opening new branches beyond boundaries estab-
lished during the Great Depression. However, growth 
was increasingly accomplished by a series of mergers 
and acquisitions that helped created a number of large 
multi-state and even national mortgage banking entities. 
Moreover, emerging technology in data processing and 
telecommunications and the creation of nationally rec-
ognized brands enabled larger organizations to enhance 
the economies of scale of their operations and the scope 
of their product offerings.44 
40   The concept of regulatory arbitrage is that by reducing its regulatory oversight, a single regulator could encourage regulated entities to seek 
a new charter to conduct business under their supervision.  To the extent other regulators depend on fees from regulated entities to fund their 
operations, this could spark a form of destructive competition among regulators that would drive down regulatory enforcement across the 
board.	See	letter	from	Consumer	Federation	of	America	to	the	Chief	Counsel’s	Office,	Office	of	Thrift	Supervison,	dated	January	24,	2005	and	
regarding	proposed	regulation	No.	2004-53.		Available	at	http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/OTScra0102405.pdf.
41   As a result of amendments in GLBA, small institutions that receive a top rating of Outstanding in their last examination do not face another 
routine CRA examination for at least 60 months.  Small institutions that are rated Satisfactory in their last CRA examination do not receive 
another	routine	CRA	examination	for	at	least	48	months.		Small	Banks	are	depository	institutions	with	less	than	$1	billion	in	assets	(adjusted	
for	inflation).		Regulators	may	conduct	CRA	examinations	for	larger	institutions	more	frequently.
42   Allen Fishbein. “The Ongoing Experiment with ‘Regulation from Below’”:  Expanded Reporting Requirements for HMDA and CRA” Housing 
Policy	Debate,	3:2	(1992),	available	at	http://www.knowledgeplex.org/kp/text_document_summary/scholarly_article/relfiles/hpd_0302_fish-
bein.pdf.
43   Supervision varies greatly among the states and amongst the regulators.  For example, while the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulates 
some independent mortgage banks, they have an arguably less robust examination process.
44   Robert B. Avery, et al., “Trends in Home Purchase Lending: Consolidation and the Community Reinvestment Act,” Federal Reserve Bulletin 
(February,	1999),	available	at	http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/1999/0299lead.pdf.	Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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The consolidation of the banking industry was 
evident on many fronts. In a companion paper in this 
edited volume, Avery, Courchane, and Zorn report that 
by 2007 the 25 largest depository institutions (deter-
mined by assets) operated nearly 40 percent of all 
retail banking offices, up from just ten percent in 1987. 
Similarly, over the two decades from 1987 to 2007, 
the share of deposits received by the top 25 banking 
organizations more than doubled to nearly 55 percent, 
while their share of mortgages soared nearly threefold to 
67 percent.45 
These trends towards consolidation posed numerous 
challenges to smaller, locally-based banks and thrifts that 
were once the mainstay of both retail banking and mort-
gage lending. Lacking the economies of scale to com-
pete with these financial services giants on many fronts, 
over the past two decades smaller banks and thrifts cut 
back on their residential mortgage origination activities 
or abandoned them entirely. Instead, many smaller com-
munity banks chose to focus on the provision of other 
forms of consumer credit (e.g., auto loans and small 
business loans) and other fee-based banking services. By 
early in the new century this transformation was nearly 
complete. For example, by 2006, the last full year before 
the onset of the mortgage market meltdown, HMDA 
reported that of the 4,150 banking organizations making 
home purchase mortgage loans, 3,977 made fewer than 
1,000 loans and 3,089 fewer than 100 loans.46 Collec-
tively, organizations making fewer than 1,000 loans ac-
counted for only five percent of all home purchase loans 
originated that year. 
The Growth of Secondary Market Sources of Funding 
and Wholesale Lending
While the retail banking industry was consolidating, 
the pooling and selling of packages of mortgages 
to investors around the world replaced deposit-
taking activities as the principal source of funding for 
residential mortgages. Expanding secondary market 
institutions included: Ginnie Mae, an organization 
created to securitize the government-insured portions 
of the market; Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two 
government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that securitize 
large shares of conventional conforming loans; and a 
host of Wall Street investment banks and private issuers 
of mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
Traditionally, mortgage sales and outreach ef-
forts were conducted by the retail lending divisions of 
deposit-taking organizations, with loan officers who 
worked for the banks and thrifts that initially funded 
the loan.47 Over the past decade, an increasing share of 
loans was funded by large mortgage banking operations 
termed “wholesale lenders,” including entities owned by 
deposit-taking banks and thrifts, stand-alone entities, and 
components of large Wall Street investment operations. 
According to one industry source, wholesale operations 
accounted for some 56 percent of all prime loans and 78 
percent of all non-prime loans in 2005.48 
As access to non-depository sources of residential 
mortgage capital expanded, the growth of secondary 
market operations also fueled the rapid expansion of 
nonbank lenders, including independent mortgage bank-
ing companies, as well as a range of mortgage banking 
subsidiaries and affiliates of traditional deposit-taking or-
ganizations. Contributing to industry consolidation was 
the fact that many formerly independent mortgage bank-
ing operations merged with or were acquired by large 
deposit-taking operations. At the same time, several large 
independent mortgage and finance companies including 
New Century, Option One, and Ameriquest continued 
to compete directly with large deposit-taking banking 
organizations in mortgage markets across the country. 
The Proliferation of New Product Development
Along with the emergence of mortgage industry gi-
ants, new approaches emerged in the marketing and 
sales of mortgage products to individual borrowers. For 
example, among the various financial services pro-
vided by banks and related businesses, consumer and 
mortgage lending require more extensive marketing, 
45   Robert B. Avery, Marcia J. Courchane, and Peter M. Zorn, “The CRA Within a Changing Financial Landscape.”
46   Joint Center for Housing Studies tabulation of HMDA.  Note that HMDA data do not uniformly cover loans made by lenders in rural markets, 
and hence may underestimate small bank lending in rural areas.
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customer support, account management, and servicing 
operations. Large-scale operations can spread the high 
fixed costs associated with these tasks across a size-
able customer base. In addition, the widespread use of 
risk-based pricing and arguably enhanced capacity to 
evaluate borrower risk gave rise to an explosion of new 
mortgage products. Credit scoring was also used to un-
derwrite new types of adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), 
such as interest-only and payment-option ARMs, and 
ever-increasing volumes of low-down-payment mort-
gages, stated income loans, and higher-risk mortgages. 
Unfortunately, many of these new products proved to 
be very risky and by 2002 delinquency and foreclosure 
rates were on the rise, especially for subprime products 
issued to LMI borrowers. 
Industry Structure and Current  
Regulatory Challenges
With the complexity and depth of the financial crisis 
creating a collapse of the credit markets, some believe 
that new regulation is “up for grabs.” Since the late 1990s, 
changes in the structure of the financial services industry, 
particularly for mortgage banking, have weakened the link 
between mortgage lending and the branch-based deposit-
taking on which the CRA was based. Further, Alan Green-
span noted the financial sector’s inability to police itself 
contributed to the crisis.49 Some see the current crisis as an 
opportunity to promote the competitiveness of those small 
lending organizations that do have suitable risk manage-
ment skills and understand the communities where they 
lend. Yet, over the longer term it is more likely that larger 
organizations, with their enhanced capacity to tap global 
capital markets and resulting operational economies of 
scale, will continue to dominate mortgage lending. Even 
so, well-managed smaller and regional-scale organiza-
tions should have the opportunity to recapture some of the 
market share they lost over the past three decades.
To ensure the future safety and soundness of the 
financial system, today’s reforms will need to address 
the structural inadequacies that contributed to the cur-
rent crisis. The range of existing regulations (from the 
consumer protections of the CRA, Home Ownership 
and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), ECOA, Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA), and Truth In Lending Act (TILA) to 
the monitoring of consumer reporting and ratings agen-
cies and the oversight of the secondary market outlets) 
must be considered, as some consumers will continue to 
be uninformed and vulnerable to those who see an op-
portunity to take advantage of them.50 Below we discuss 
these national trends and their implications for the CRA’s 
impact on lending to lower-income borrowers and com-
munities, as well as the variation in the act’s regulatory 
reach across metropolitan areas and individual lenders. 
The CRA and Assessment Area Lending 
To address the historic problem of redlining of spa-
tially concentrated LMI borrowers and minority com-
munities, CRA examinations have concentrated on the 
spatial distribution of loans according to borrower and 
neighborhood income. This parameter is measured by 
a bank’s mortgage lending record within its assessment 
area (the geographic areas where institutions have their 
main office, branches, and deposit-taking ATMs, as well 
as the surrounding areas where banks have originated a 
substantial portion of loans) and across income ranges 
of borrowers and neighborhoods.51 In an effort to ensure 
that deposit-taking institutions meet the credit needs of 
the communities they serve, CRA regulators evaluate the 
lending inside the lender’s CRA-defined assessment area 
and compare it to the activity of the lender’s peers. The 
assessment area was originally adopted to ensure that 
deposit money from one area is not redeployed to make 
a disproportionate share of loans outside the assessment 
area. However, future reforms will need to consider this 
method of comparison and determine whether an ab-
solute standard or a different kind of comparison is best 
suited to today’s financial world.
As indicated by previous Joint Center research, mort-
gages made by depository institutions to borrowers living 
in their assessment areas are subject to the most detailed 
CRA review. As previously mentioned, CRA regulations 
apply only to the lending activity of deposit-taking orga-





51   The Code of Federal Regulations Title 12 Part 228.41 provides that a bank must delineate one or more assessment areas within which the 
Federal	Reserve	System	evaluates	the	bank’s	record.		Originally,	the	delineation	was	the	area	surrounding	the	lender’s	office	and	branches.	In	
the	1995	revisions	this	grew	to	include	the	area	around	its	deposit-taking	facilities	including	ATMs	as	well	as	the	surrounding	area	in	which	the	
bank originated or purchased a substantial portion of its loans.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
22
ies or affiliates of these organizations that conduct the 
bulk of their activity outside of the designated assess-
ment areas. Meanwhile, loans made by independent 
mortgage companies (also called nonbanks) fall entirely 
outside the regulatory reach of the CRA. Given the 
dramatic changes in the financial landscape, with new 
organizational structures (financial holding companies, 
multinational financial enterprises, and nonbank lenders) 
and delivery mechanisms (internet, mobile, and phone 
banking), the traditional concept of assessment area no 
longer captures a lender’s community. 
The increasing share of loans made by mortgage 
banking subsidiaries or affiliates of bank holding com-
panies and by independent mortgage companies has 
brought a concomitant decline in the share of mortgage 
loans originated by deposit-taking institutions in the 
assessment areas where they maintain branch bank-
ing operations (Exhibit 1). Between 1993 and 2006, the 
number of home purchase loans made by CRA-regulated 
institutions in their assessment areas as a share of all 
home purchase loans fell from 36.1 to 26 percent. The 
decline was even more dramatic for home refinance 
lending: the CRA assessment area share fell from close to 
45 percent in 1993 to just over 25 percent in 2006. For 
all loans (both home improvement and refinance), the 
share fell from 40.6 percent to 25.6 percent. 
This decline reflects two distinct limitations of CRA 
coverage. First, from 1994 through 2006, the first full 
year prior to the onset of the mortgage market melt-
down, home purchase lending by independent mortgage 
companies and credit unions (lending organizations 
not covered by the CRA) grew by 122 percent, nearly 
four times faster than lending by banking organizations 
operating within their CRA-defined assessment areas. 
Next, even among CRA-regulated institutions, the fastest 
growth took place outside the markets where these orga-
nizations maintained deposit-taking branches, and hence 
that lending was not subject to the most stringent aspects 
of the CRA. These out of assessment area loans are there-
fore not equally examined to determine whether they 
serve the needs of lower-income borrowers and com-
munities. Indeed, from 1994 to 2006, out of assessment 
area lending by CRA-regulated banking organizations 
grew by 187 percent. Similar numbers were recorded for 
refinance lending.52 
The Joint Center has made a conservative and 
simplifying assumption: that all lending done by the 
depository itself and its affiliates and subsidiaries within 
52	 	From	1994	to	2006,	refinance	lending	by	CRA-regulated	banks	and	thrifts	operating	in	their	assessment	area	increased	by	only	59	percent,	
compared	with	growth	of	148	percent	for	non-regulated	entities	(independent	mortgage	companies	and	credit	unions)	and	334	percent	CRA-
regulated entities operating outside their assessment areas.
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an assessment area is covered by detailed CRA exami-
nations.53 To the extent that some unknown number of 
loans made by affiliates or subsidiaries are not put for-
ward for examination, this assumption results in a clear 
overstatement of the share of all loans subject to detailed 
CRA review. Note that in 2006, the last year depicted 
in Exhibit 1, affiliates and subsidiaries accounted for 
approximately one fifth of assessment area lending. As a 
result, the share of loans subject to detailed CRA assess-
ment could be as low as 20 percent, assuming that all 
entities take advantage of the rule that permits discre-
tion in reporting.54 As a result, the finding depicted in 
Exhibit 1—that the share of all loans covered by detailed 
CRA review has fallen dramatically over the 1994-2006 
period—is a conservative estimate of these trends.
CRA Coverage Varies By Neighborhood and Metro Area
The relative importance of assessment-area lending 
by depository institutions covered by the CRA also varies 
by neighborhood income and racial/ethnic composition, 
and from one metro area to another. For example, the 
nation’s historically disadvantaged minority groups have 
less protection from the CRA given that they are less like-
ly to receive a loan from a CRA-regulated institution. The 
data show that households living in higher-income and 
largely white neighborhoods are nearly 30 percent more 
likely to receive a loan from a CRA-regulated assessment 
area lender than a borrower living in a largely minority, 
lower-income area (30.7 percent versus 23.2 percent, 
see Exhibit 2). A similar pattern holds for refinance lend-
ing. In both instances, borrowers in lowest-income and/
or minority areas are most likely to obtain mortgage 
finance from independent mortgage companies, enti-
ties not covered by CRA regulations, and are therefore 
provided fewer consumer protections. 
There is also significant variation in assessment area 
lending across metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). 
These patterns, in turn, reflect a spatial variation in bank-
ing and mortgage industry organization across metropol-
itan areas. Among other things, they reflect differences in 
53   This assumption is common in research evaluating assessment area lending.
54   According to the Joint Center Enhanced HMDA database, of the approximately 2.3 million loans made by depository institutions directly or by 
their	subsidiaries	or	affiliates	in	designated	assessment	areas	in	2006,	some	574,000	(or	20	percent)	were	made	by	affiliates	and	subsidiaries.	
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the competitiveness of locally based banks, the relative 
attractiveness of specific metro area markets to nonbank 
lenders, and variations in state-level banking regula-
tions. While it is difficult to assess the exact importance 
of each factor, assessment area lenders can account for 
more than 50 percent of all mortgage loans in some met-
ropolitan areas and less than 20 percent in others.55 
CRA Coverage Varies by Lender and Product Type
The variation of CRA coverage across three broad 
types of lending (in assessment area lending by CRA-
regulated banking organizations, out of assessment area 
lending by CRA-regulated banking organizations, and 
lending by non-CRA-regulated independent mortgage 
companies) also has implications for CRA coverage. 
Note that CRA assessment area lenders are evaluated on 
the basis of their efforts in extending mortgage loans to 
lower-income borrowers (borrowers with incomes below 
80 percent of metro area median income) and/or to 
lower-income neighborhoods (e.g. neighborhoods with 
median household income less than 80 percent of metro 
area median). Since a disproportionately large share of 
mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures are now taking 
place in these same lower-income communities, some 
commentators have suggested that CRA requirements 
have contributed to the growing problem of mortgage 
delinquencies. 
To evaluate these claims, the Joint Center reviewed 
2004-2007 HMDA data on higher-priced loans, a vari-
able designed by the Federal Reserve research staff as 
a proxy for non-prime lending to assess lending pat-
terns across borrowers of differing characteristics.56 This 
review suggested that the largest share of higher-priced 
loans made to lower-income borrowers were originated 
by a handful of large independent mortgage companies, 
while CRA regulations paid disproportionate attention 
to smaller assessment area lenders. Despite recent as-
sertions to the contrary, CRA assessment area lending 
criteria did not play a central role in the explosion of 
high-risk lending to low-income borrowers living in  
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low-income and minority communities. For example, 
from 2004 through 2006 CRA-regulated depository 
institutions operating inside their assessment areas made 
31 percent of all lower-priced home loans (purchase plus 
refinance loans) to low-income borrowers or borrowers 
living in low-income neighborhoods, yet accounted for 
only nine percent of higher-priced loans in their assess-
ment areas made to low-income borrowers or low-in-
come neighborhoods.57 In contrast, less supervised inde-
pendent mortgage companies dominated the origination 
of higher-priced loans made to low-income borrowers 
and communities, capturing 55 percent of this market 
segment. CRA-regulated banking organizations operating 
outside their assessment area also claimed a significant 
share of this higher-priced market segment. 
The Adverse Impact of Uneven Coverage
The spatial variation of assessment area lending 
across neighborhoods and metropolitan areas has im-
plications for borrowers and lenders alike. The CRA was 
designed to expand access to credit to LMI borrowers, 
and/or borrowers living in LMI neighborhoods in a man-
ner consistent with the safety and soundness of the bank 
or thrift originating the loan. Yet, depending on which 
lender serves a neighborhood and/or city, borrowers 
have different access to credit and consumer protection.
Though not explicitly designed to promote fair lend-
ing, the CRA has historically played a role in protect-
ing borrowers from abusive mortgage lending practices 
including redlining and other forms of racial discrimina-
tion. Since African Americans and Hispanics constitute 
a disproportionately large share of lower-income house-
holds and households living in lower-income communi-
ties, these groups have been differentially served by CRA 
rules designed to expand access to mortgage capital. Be-
cause fair lending reviews often accompany CRA exami-
nations, and federal regulators have relatively recently 
stated that lending in violation of federal fair lending 
laws can reduce a lending institution’s CRA ratings, the 
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While it remains important that all prime-qualified 
borrowers have equal access to prime loans on fair 
terms, guaranteeing fair terms and equal access for 
subprime borrowers is an equally worthy goal. Yet, the 
largest share of regulated banks and thrifts make no 
or only a few higher-priced loans. Though the reasons 
for this may vary, many regulated entities claim that 
they are unable to effectively compete in the subprime 
marketplace with less-regulated nonbanks. However, by 
choosing not to compete in the non-prime marketplace 
today, many CRA-regulated banks and thrifts may have 
ceded territory to their less-supervised competitors who 
saw an opportunity to use risk based pricing to compete, 
while CRA-regulated institutions chose not to engage in 
this marketplace. 
In fact, nonbank independent mortgage companies 
do not have to meet CRA requirements and indeed may 
even gain a market advantage by being less regulated 
and meeting less stringent capital requirements. This 
is especially important, given the fact that many of the 
most risky loans—made to some of the nation’s most 
disadvantaged lower–income borrowers—were made 
by these less-regulated lending organizations. Moreover, 
unlike their bank counterparts who have a more vis-
ible presence in the markets they serve, many nonbanks 
marketed their products to subprime borrowers through 
thousands of less-regulated mortgage brokers and hence 
have less sensitivity to the reputational risks associated 
with originating more default-prone products. 
One important consequence of this shifting com-
petitive balance is that consumers living in areas with 
a limited presence of CRA assessment area lenders do 
not receive the same degree of CRA-based consumer 
protection as those living where assessment area lenders 
retain a more substantial market presence. This includes 
the consumer benefits that derive from CRA-mandated 
oversight of lending in LMI communities and CRA-linked 
engagement with fair lending monitoring and enforce-
ment activities. 
Regulatory Reform of the CRA
As argued throughout this paper, fundamental fair-
ness suggests that the nature and extent of federal over-
sight and consumer protection should not depend on 
whether a loan application is submitted by a loan officer 
working for a CRA-regulated institution or a mortgage 
broker working for a nonbank or CRA-regulated bank 
operating outside its assessment area. Nor should it mat-
ter to the consumer which particular retailer or wholesal-
er originates the mortgage, and which secondary market 
channel is tapped to secure the investment dollars that 
ultimately fund the loan. Instead, all consumers need 
access to an efficient mortgage market built on a founda-
tion of uniform and fair regulations and oversight. While 
the CRA is not the cure for all the woes of the financial 
industry, the CRA could be strengthened considerably to 
ensure equal access to safe and profitable lending. Many 
of the critical issues raised in the 2001 ANPR were not 
substantially addressed and now provide a good point of 
departure for future regulatory reform. 
Over the past decade, the combination of rising rates 
of homeownership and the ability of distressed borrow-
ers to use growing home equity to refinance their way 
out of delinquency masked the structural flaws of the 
mortgage system. While some studies pointed to these 
flaws, the prevailing political climate favored deregula-
tion, and the calls for reform were not heeded. As the 
ongoing collapse of the nation’s mortgage banking sys-
tem now illustrates, reforms are vital to ensure appropri-
ate oversight to limit future abuses as credit is restored. 
This section suggests some potential areas for reform.
CRA Reform Is a Good Place to Start
When Congress modernized financial services 
through the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, it did little 
to bring the CRA (or other consumer protection regula-
tions) into conformance with the rapidly evolving finan-
cial services world. This created a competitive advantage 
for nonbank lenders and provided fewer consumer pro-
tections to their borrowers. Though nonbank institutions 
clearly played a key role in the boom and bust of the 
subprime market and the resulting market disruption and 
are involved in the complex matrix of financial relation-
ships, they are subject to only limited oversight. Addi-
tionally, though the net effect of this marginally regulated 
lending has put the safety and soundness of the entire 
financial system at risk, there has still not been enough 
focus on the riskiest segments of the marketplace. Fur-
ther, the rationale for government regulation must move 
beyond a quid pro quo for depository insurance and 
other federal benefits. 
To realign regulation with the evolving structure of 
the financial services industry, uniformity of regulation 
is needed across all segments of the mortgage industry. 
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appropriate reforms might include improvement in the 
delineation of assessment areas, strengthening of fair 
lending enforcement, and improvements in compliance 
monitoring through software and data analysis tech-
niques specifically designed to detect fraud. 
Apply the CRA Framework to All Lenders
The CRA should be uniformly expanded to cover in-
dependent mortgage banking companies and other newly 
emerging nonbank lenders; it should be made applicable 
to the subsidiaries and affiliates of depository institu-
tions; and it must be enforced through an appropriately 
funded regulator. The fact that nonbanks, affiliates, and 
subsidiaries are not uniformly regulated denies consumers 
equal access to the benefits of legally mandated federal 
oversight. It may also distort competition if some market 
participants shift business from one market segment to the 
next to avoid regulation. When considering how to expand 
the CRA, establishing appropriate evaluation methodology 
is critical, as the current criteria may be inadequate for ap-
plication to new institution types and their lending. 
One model to consider is the Massachusetts Mort-
gage Lender Community Investment (MLCI) law, which 
took effect on September 5, 2008.58 While it may still be 
too early to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the 
MLCI, the fact that it is uniformly applied to all Massa-
chusetts mortgage lenders and mortgage loans is a step 
in the right direction. The MLCI created a two-pronged 
test to evaluate a lender’s lending and services, similar 
to the intermediate small-bank approach mentioned 
earlier. The MLCI Lending Test considers the geographic 
distribution of lending to LMI areas, borrower charac-
teristics, innovative or flexible lending practices within 
the bounds of safety and soundness, fair lending perfor-
mance, and loss of affordable housing. This last criterion 
was developed to allow the MLCI to proactively consid-
er predatory practices that reduce the stock of affordable 
housing, such as early payment defaults. The Service 
Test of the MLCI is unusual in that it considers the avail-
ability and effectiveness of the lender’s delivery systems 
to LMI communities (such as whether they incorporate 
the internet), as well as the lender’s community devel-
opment services and loss mitigation practices. 
Expand Assessment Area Definitions 
Expanding the definition of assessment area has 
gone unaddressed in previous rule making and should 
be placed at the top of a reform agenda. Most agree 
that the assessment area definition does not account for 
today’s world of electronic banking and national-scale 
mortgage-lending operations. In light of these changes, 
the traditional concept of assessment area needs to be 
reconsidered. In moving forward, it would be useful 
to review the comments provided in response to the 
2001 ANPR. For example, the National Association of 
Homebuilders proposed that assessment areas should 
be where retail banking services are delivered and not 
related to branch or ATM locations.59 Alternatively, the 
National Community Reinvestment Coalition suggested 
that assessment areas should be expanded to any state 
or MSA where the lender (including the independent 
mortgage companies and the subsidiaries and affiliates 
of regulated depositories) achieves a significant market 
presence–such as one-half of one percent of all loans.60 
Other regulations have already broadened the con-
cept of assessment areas and could be considered. The 
2008 Massachusetts law (MLCI) assigns the assessment 
area as the entire state, unless a lender “opts out” and 
the request is approved by an examiner. Because of the 
difficulty of assigning a geographic assessment area for 
lenders serving military personnel, the current CRA regu-
lation defines the assessment area as the entire customer 
base which in essence abandons assessment areas alto-
gether and does not address non-customers who are not 
served. Similarly, Massachusetts uses the membership 
base as the definition for assessing credit unions. These 
approaches could be adapted and applied to internet 
banks and other non-traditional entities. As mentioned 
previously, the current practice is to compare an institu-
tion to its peers. Future reforms will need to address the 




tion 14 and the implementing regulation 209 CMR 46.000 is generally based on the federal legislation yet has an extra exam category of “high 
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59   National Association of Homebuilders, “Comments on Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding CRA,” Letter from David Crowe, 
Senior Staff Vice President, Washington, DC, October 18, 2001.
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Expand Fair Lending Enforcement
Unlike other antidiscrimination laws, fair lending 
laws are enforced by banking regulators, who examine 
regulated banks for illegal and discriminatory practices, 
which are contrary to the goals of the CRA and can jeop-
ardize the safety and soundness of the banking system.61 
CRA loan-level reviews are an important method for en-
suring that regulated entities are in compliance with fair 
lending laws. When examiners identify a poor program, 
they issue a compliance report and may choose to exam-
ine that violator more often, enter informal enforcement 
actions, or use formal public enforcement actions.62 
While adverse findings and illegal credit practices are 
factored into the CRA rating by examiners, it remains 
unclear what specific criteria or thresholds are used to 
ensure that a lenders’ score is reduced according to its 
fair lending violations.63 
While regulators believe that their proactive approach 
allows few violations, a gap in oversight can occur when 
not all institutions are subject to loan-level review or not 
all loans are included in these reviews. Violations appear 
to be increasing within under-supervised channels, and 
hands-on loan oversight and fair lending review may 
help remedy these violations. Beyond applying fair lend-
ing review to non CRA-regulated institutions and evalu-
ating fair lending according to race and other protected 
status, the inclusion of egregious violations in the public 
performance report could also increase transparency and 
strengthen fair lending enforcement.
Use Improved Data Collection and Software to 
Improve Compliance Monitoring
HMDA data have provided a critical tool for regula-
tors, lenders, and community groups to evaluate whether 
covered institutions and loans are meeting the credit 
needs of the communities they serve. HMDA statistical 
analysis has allowed regulators to evaluate fair lend-
ing violations and identify potential problem lenders or 
products. Meanwhile, the public disclosure of HMDA 
has created greater transparency and enforcement of 
CRA regulations and allowed community groups to 
evaluate the contributions of lenders who serve their 
communities.
Yet, to conduct thorough analysis, regulators have 
at times purchased data from private sources to enforce 
public regulations. It is in the public interest for regula-
tors to have access to loan-level data, like those col-
lected under HMDA, that include detail on loan pricing 
and creditworthiness; in this way, regulators can provide 
proper oversight and examiners can conduct thorough 
file reviews. Furthermore, though some claim that 
increased data collection for regulatory or public uses is 
onerous, those data are already provided to private data 
aggregators in machine-readable form. In short, given 
better and more uniform loan-level data, regulators may 
be able to conduct more focused (and potentially auto-
mated) reviews to detect mortgage abuse and fraud. 
All Institutions Provide All Services
The CRA was established to ensure that if a lender is 
in the mortgage business, it must be safely and soundly 
in the business for all customers. Recall that the CRA was 
designed to ensure that regulated banks and thrifts met 
the credit needs of all residents of their communities. 
Though we acknowledge that specialization has a role in 
mortgage lending, in the same way that utility companies 
cannot decide to serve only some neighborhoods, cherry-
picking borrowers or even neighborhoods with specific 
credit scores is not in the public interest. CRA implemen-
tation should ensure that regulated entities do not opt out 
of their responsibility to meet the needs of the credit im-
paired, but otherwise sound, low-income and low-wealth 
borrowers who participate in the non-prime market. 
All lenders should be required to evaluate all custom-
ers using adequate underwriting and appraisal techniques. 
At minimum, each regulated entity could be required to 
serve the full range of the credit needs of the community 
by offering referrals to other entities that provide non-
61   John R. Walter, “The Fair Lending Laws and Their Enforcement,” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 81:4 (1995).
62   Formal public enforcement actions may include civil money penalties, Written Agreements, or Cease and Desist Orders.  Bank regulations also 
mandate that the regulator refer all patterns and practices of discrimination to the Department of Justice, which determines whether or not to 
investigate and whether the results warrant an administrative enforcement by the FRB, a public civil enforcement, or a settlement.
63   Sandra Braunstein, “The Community Reinvestment Act and fair lending examination processes,”  testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Domestic	Policy,	Committee	on	Oversight	and	Government	Reform,	U.S.	House	of	Representatives,	Washington,	DC,	2007.		Located	at:	http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/braunstein20071024a.htm.	Braunstein’s	testimony	provides	two	excellent	examples	of	when	
violations did and did not require a reduced CRA rating.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
29
prime mortgages on a fair and non-discriminatory basis, 
or growing correspondent relationships with specific 
lenders or nonprofits. Admittedly, mandating that any 
particular market participant engage in non-prime lend-
ing is fraught with peril. Over the years, many regulated 
thrifts and banks, often working in conjunction with 
non-profit organizations, have developed the capacity to 
participate in non-prime markets. This evidence suggests 
that, given the proper incentives, banks and thrifts now 
largely specializing exclusively in prime lending could 
also acquire the expertise necessary to participate in the 
non-prime market and serve low-wealth, low-income, 
and/or subprime borrowers who cannot qualify for prime 
loan products. 
Reform of Other Elements of the  
Regulatory Environment 
This paper calls for uniform regulation for all mort-
gage lenders to reduce predatory practices, ensure a 
certain degree of consumer protection, and level the 
playing field for all lenders. Because many of the basic 
consumer protections are in place in the CRA-regulated 
portions of the market, the CRA provides a valuable 
framework for successful and cost-effective lending 
regulation market-wide. Yet, CRA reform is just one of 
a broad range of needed reforms in the financial sys-
tem. Though a uniform CRA could address many of the 
concerns about access to fair credit, it is also critical to 
reinforce the consumer protections offered through the 
Truth In Lending Act, the Real Estate Settlement Proce-
dures Act, and the Home Ownership and Equity Protec-
tion Act (HOEPA). 
In remarks made to the CRA and Fair Lending Col-
loquium in Boston in 2001, the late Federal Reserve 
Governor Edward M. Gramlich reminded his audience 
that the art of CRA regulation is the balance between 
assessing the quantity and quality of an institution’s 
lending and determining whether it has had a net posi-
tive effect on the community. Undoubtedly, the CRA 
has given financial institutions incentives to reinvest in 
underserved communities and community development 
organizations. As CRA regulations are expanded to ap-
ply to all mortgage lenders, considering how the CRA 
has helped to provide LMI borrowers better access to 
fair credit is worthy of examination. 
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